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Abstract
“Public Good Provision and the Comparative Statics
of Optimal Nonlinear Income Taxation”
by
Craig Brett and John A. Weymark
Comparative static properties of the solution to an optimal nonlinear income tax
problem are provided for a model in which the government both designs an income tax
schedule for redistributive purposes and provides a public good optimally. There are two
types of individuals, distinguished by their skill levels, who have the same quasilinear
preferences for labour supply and the consumption of a private and a public good. The
parameters for which comparative statics are obtained are the weights in a weighted
utilitarian social welfare function, the prices of the private and public goods, a taste
parameter that measures the onerousness of working, and the individual skill levels.
Journal of Economic Literature classiﬁcation numbers: D82, H21, H41.
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1. Introduction
There are relatively few comparative static results available for models of optimal non-
linear income taxation. Weymark (1987) has derived a number of comparative static
properties of the solution to a ﬁnite population version of the Mirrlees (1971) nonlinear
income tax problem for the case in which individual preferences are quasilinear. In the
Mirrlees model, individuals only diﬀer in their skill levels and the only role for the gov-
ernment is to design an income tax schedule for redistributive purposes. In this article,
we extend Weymark’s analysis by considering the implications for his results of adding
public good provision as a second policy instrument for the government in an economy
with two types of individuals.1
The main focus of the literature on optimal taxation with a public good has been the
identiﬁcation of conditions that characterize the optimal provision of the public good. In
particular, considerable attention has been devoted to determining when the Samuelson
(1954) Rule continues to hold in the absence of personalized lump-sum taxation, and to
determining whether the Samuelson Rule leads to over- or under-provision when it is not
optimal to employ this rule. Much of this analysis, which has its origins in the insightful
discussion of Pigou (1947) on the use of distortionary taxes to ﬁnance public goods, has
been conducted using models in which linear commodity taxes are the only available tax
instruments. See Myles (1995) for an introduction to this literature.
Financing public good provision using nonlinear incomes taxes, either as a substitute
for or as a supplement to commodity taxation, has been considered by Boadway and Keen
(1993), Christiansen (1981), Edwards, Keen, and Tuomala (1994), Mirrlees (1976), Nava,
Schroyen, and Marchand (1996), and Tuomala (1990), among others. When individuals
have identical preferences and these preferences are represented by a strictly concave
utility function, Christiansen (1981) and Boadway and Keen (1993) have shown that
the Samuelson Rule for the optimal provision of a public good holds at the solution
to the optimal nonlinear income tax problem if the utility function is weakly separable
between consumption and labour supply. As a consequence, the public good serves
no redistributive purpose when these assumptions are satisﬁed. We show that these
conclusions also hold when preferences are quasilinear.
As in the Mirrlees model, we assume that individuals diﬀer only in their labour
productivities. Here, there are only two skill levels, as in Boadway and Keen (1993),
Edwards, Keen, and Tuomala (1994), and Nava, Schroyen, and Marchand (1996). Indi-
viduals supply labour and consume a private and a public good. Everyone has the same
1Recently, a number of comparative static properties of optimal nonlinear income taxes when pref-
erences are quasilinear have been developed for economies with only two possible skill levels. Hamilton
and Pestieau (2002) have investigated the eﬀects on the individuals’ utilities of changing the skill dis-
tribution. Boadway and Pestieau (2004) have determined how the utility possibilities frontier responds
to changes in the skill distribution and in the exogenous amount of revenue available for redistributive
purposes. Cebreiro-Go´mez (2002) has considered a two-country extension of the Weymark (1987) model
and has identiﬁed the impact on the marginal tax rates faced by individuals of changing the producer
prices in each of the countries.
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preferences and these preferences are represented by a quasilinear utility function that
is linear in the amount of labour supplied. A linear production technology is used to
produce the two consumption goods using labour in eﬃciency units as the sole input.
The government, who knows the distribution of types, but does not know who has which
skill level, chooses a nonlinear income tax schedule to maximize a weighted utilitarian
social welfare function subject to a production-feasibility constraint and the constraint
that each person’s consumption bundle is optimal for him given the tax schedule. The
parameters that are varied in our comparative static analysis are (i) the weights in the
social welfare function, (ii) the prices (marginal costs) of the private and public goods,
(iii) a taste parameter that measures the onerousness of working, and (iv) the skill levels
of the two individuals. We are interested in determining how a marginal change in each
of these parameters aﬀects the optimal allocation of goods and services and the marginal
tax rate faced by the low-skilled individual.2 Some clear-cut comparative statics for the
optimal consumptions of the private and public goods are obtained for each of the pa-
rameter changes considered, but the results are less deﬁnitive for the other endogenous
variables.
With our quasilinear preference assumption, the optimal consumptions of the private
and public goods can be obtained by solving a “reduced-form” optimization problem
that only involves these variables. The optimal incomes are functions of these optimal
consumptions. In models without a public good, similar reduced-form problems were de-
veloped by Lollivier and Rochet (1983) for a continuum of individuals and by Weymark
(1986) for a ﬁnite population. Weymark’s reduced-form problem was used by Weymark
(1987) to help obtain his comparative static results. A feature of the private good model
with quasilinear preferences is that an explicit solution exists for the optimal consump-
tions as a function of the underlying parameters. This is not the case when there is also
a public good. As a consequence, we have to employ diﬀerent techniques to analyse the
comparative static properties of our reduced-form problem than does Weymark (1987).
We present our model in Section 2. In Section 3, we establish some properties of the
solution to our optimal nonlinear income tax problem and show how the optimal allo-
cation can be obtained using a reduced-form optimization problem for the consumption
variables. In Section 4, we use the ﬁrst-order conditions from the reduced-form problem
to obtain a matrix that contains expressions showing how to optimally change each of
the consumption variables in response to a marginal increase in each of our parameters.
Using this matrix, we develop our comparative static results for the technology and pref-
erence parameters in Section 5 and for the skill levels and welfare weights in Section 6.
Some possible extensions of our analysis are discussed in Section 7. Proofs of our results
may be found in the Appendix.
2As is standard in models of this kind, it is always optimal for the high-skilled individual to face a
zero marginal tax rate.
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2. The Model
There are two individuals, indexed by i = 1, 2. These individuals diﬀer in ability, with
an individual of type i possessing skill level wi.
3 It is assumed that 0 < w1 < w2. As is
customary in the nonlinear income tax literature, ability is interpreted as a measure of
the eﬀectiveness of an individual’s labour input in producing goods. Individual i’s labour
supply in eﬃciency units is
yi = wili, i = 1, 2, (2.1)
where li is i’s actual labour supply in, for example, hours.
Labour in eﬃciency units is a homogenous input that is used to produce a private
good and a public good using a linear production technology. The input-output vector
(l1, l2, c, g) ∈ R4+ satisﬁes the economy’s production constraint if
pc + qg ≤
2∑
i=1
wili, (2.2)
where c and g are, respectively, the quantities of the private and public goods produced.4
An allocation for this economy is a vector (y1, y2, c1, c2, g) ∈ R5+, where ci is i’s consump-
tion of the private good. Because
∑2
i=1 ci = c, it follows from (2.1) that (2.2) can be
rewritten as
p
2∑
i=1
ci + qg ≤
2∑
i=1
yi. (2.3)
An allocation satisfying (2.3) is production feasible.
The input and output markets are perfectly competitive. Thus, p is the producer
price of the private good, q is the producer price of the public good, wi is person i’s
wage, and yi is i’s before-tax income.
For each individual, a consumption bundle speciﬁes this individual’s labour supply and
consumptions of the private and public goods. Both individuals have the same preferences
for consumption bundles. These preferences are represented by the quasilinear utility
function u : R3+ → R, where
u(li, ci, g) = v(ci, g)− γli. (2.4)
The function v is assumed to be twice continuously diﬀerentiable at all (ci, g) = (0, 0),
continuous and nondecreasing on R2+, strictly increasing on R
2
++, and strictly concave
on R2++ with v(0, 0) = 0, vci(0, g) = ∞ for all g > 0, vg(ci, 0) = ∞ for all ci > 0,
vci(ci, g) → 0 as ci → ∞ for all g ≥ 0, and vg(ci, g) → 0 as g → ∞ for all ci ≥ 0. The
3All of the comparative static results presented here are also valid for an arbitrary number of indi-
viduals of each type.
4
R+ and R++ are, respectively, the nonnegative and positive subsets of the real line R.
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limiting assumptions on v ensure that the optimal tax problem has a solution and that
both individuals have positive consumption of both goods in this solution. The taste
parameter γ is assumed to be positive. In the absence of the public good, preferences
that are quasilinear in labour supply have been used by Boadway, Cuﬀ, and Marchand
(2000), Lollivier and Rochet (1983), Rochet (1987), and Weymark (1986, 1987), among
others, to study optimal nonlinear income taxation.5
Some of our comparative static results depend on the sign of the cross partial deriva-
tive vcig(ci, g). From Young’s Theorem, we can interpret this derivative as either (i) the
rate at which the marginal valuation of the public good changes in response to a marginal
increase in the consumption of the private good or (ii) the rate at which the marginal
utility of private consumption changes in response to a marginal increase in the quantity
of the public good.
Using (2.1), the utility function in (2.4) can be rewritten in terms of the variables yi,
ci, and g that can be observed (and controlled) by the government. The resulting utility
function U˜ i : R3+ → R is person-speciﬁc and is given by
U˜ i(yi, ci, g) = v(ci, g)− γyi/wi, i = 1, 2. (2.5)
As in Lollivier and Rochet (1983) and Weymark (1986, 1987), we work with the following
transformation of the utility function:
U i(yi, ci, g) = wiv(ci, g)− γyi, i = 1, 2. (2.6)
The representation of preferences given in (2.6) is linear in the privately-observable pa-
rameter wi. This feature of the utility function U
i simpliﬁes the analysis of the model.6
Person i’s marginal rate of substitution between income and private consumption is
MRSiyc(yi, ci, g) = γ/wivci(ci, g), i = 1, 2. (2.7)
The quasilinearity assumption implies that this marginal rate of substitution is indepen-
dent of income. The strict concavity of v implies that i’s marginal rate of substitution
is increasing in private consumption. For a given value of g, the marginal rate of substi-
tution is decreasing in wi, so in terms of income-private consumption pairs, preferences
satisfy the Mirrlees (1971)–Spence (1974) single-crossing property.
Person i’s marginal rate of substitution between public and private consumption is
MRSigc(yi, ci, g) = −
vg(ci, g)
vci(ci, g)
, i = 1, 2. (2.8)
As in (2.7), this marginal rate of substitution is independent of income.
5Diamond (1998) considers preferences that are quasilinear in consumption.
6In particular, this form of the utility function allows us to use techniques similar to those employed
by Lollivier and Rochet (1983), Rochet (1987), and Weymark (1986, 1987).
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The taxation authority can observe the individual incomes and knows that one person
has ability w1 and one person has ability w2, but does not know who is of which type.
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Furthermore, it cannot observe either person’s labour supply. As a consequence, the
government must raise the revenue it requires to pay for the public good and to pursue
its redistributive goals using an anonymous tax schedule. Individuals choose their most-
preferred income-consumption bundles from this schedule. Thus, an allocation must
satisfy the familiar incentive-compatibility (self-selection) conditions:
U1(y1, c1, g) ≥ U1(y2, c2, g) (2.9)
and
U2(y2, c2, g) ≥ U2(y1, c1, g). (2.10)
Moreover, any allocation that satisﬁes (2.9) and (2.10) can be decentralized through the
use of an anonymous taxation scheme. See, for example, Guesnerie and Seade (1983) or
Guesnerie (1995). An allocation that satisﬁes (2.9) and (2.10) is incentive compatible.
A well-known consequence of incentive compatibility is that
c1 ≤ c2 (2.11)
and
y1 ≤ y2, (2.12)
with
c1 = c2 ↔ y1 = y2. (2.13)
If (2.13) holds, the two individuals are said to be bunched.
Individual tax liabilities are computed and collected on the basis of income, and
any remaining personal income is spent on consumption of the private good. The value
of private consumption by individual i is pci, which is also i’s after-tax income. The
diﬀerence between aggregate before- and after-tax income is used to ﬁnance the provision
of the public good. The government budget constraint is therefore given by
qg ≤
2∑
i=1
(yi − pci). (2.14)
The equivalence of (2.3) and (2.14) follows from Walras’ Law.
7In our model, we do not distinguish between the taxation authority and the government. In principle,
the agencies that design the income tax schedule and that choose the level of the public good could be
distinct.
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The government has preferences over allocations represented by a weighted utilitarian
social welfare function. Using the transformed utilities in (2.6), the social welfare function
is the function W : R5+ → R given by
W(y1, y2, c1, c2, g) = λ1U1(y1, c1, g) + λ2U2(y2, c2, g). (2.15)
It is assumed that the welfare weights, λ1 and λ2, are both positive with λ1 > λ2. Because
the underlying social welfare ordering only depends on the relative welfare weights, it is
convenient to normalize these weights so that
λ1 + λ2 = 2. (2.16)
With this normalization, changes in the relative welfare weights are fully described by
changes in λ1 alone.
8
Because the set of allocations that are incentive compatible is the same as the set of
allocations that are achievable using anonymous tax schedules, the government’s optimal
nonlinear income tax problem can be described as follows.
The Optimal Nonlinear Income Tax Problem. The government chooses an alloca-
tion (y1, y2, c1, c2, g) ∈ R5+ to maximize the social welfare function (2.15) subject to the
production-feasibility constraint (2.3) and the incentive-compatibility constraints (2.9)
and (2.10).
3. Preliminary Results
Weymark (1986) has analyzed a multi-person version of the model presented in the
preceding section, but without the public good. He solved this problem in two steps.
First, for ﬁxed consumptions of the private good that are weakly monotonic in the
ability parameter (as required by incentive compatibility), he determined the optimal
incomes. By substituting the optimal values for the incomes into the objective func-
tion, the production-feasibility constraint, and the self-selection constraints, Weymark
obtained a “reduced-form” optimization problem that he used to solve for the optimal
consumptions. Although all incomes are nonnegative at the solution to his optimal non-
linear income taxation problem, in order to avoid some technical complications that arise
when the lowest type does not work, in the ﬁrst step of his procedure, Weymark per-
mitted some incomes to be negative for non-optimal values of the consumptions. As in
Weymark (1986), we develop a reduced-form optimization problem for our model with a
public good to solve for the optimal consumptions. However, in contrast to his analysis,
we only determine the optimal incomes corresponding to the optimal consumptions. We
8Note that the sum of the welfare weights is equal to the number of consumers. It is also possible to
deﬁne the social welfare function using the untransformed utility functions U˜ i in (2.4). An equal-weight
utilitarian social welfare function deﬁned using these utility functions places higher weight on person
one when rewritten in terms of the transformed utility functions. See Weymark (1986) for details.
6
assume that the underlying parameters of our problem are such that it is optimal for
everyone to have a positive income, thereby avoiding the boundary problems mentioned
above.
We begin by determining which of the constraints bind at a solution to the optimal
nonlinear income tax problem. As is standard in nonlinear income tax problems with a
single budget constaint, it is optimal for the production constraint to bind.9 When there
are only two types of individuals, at most one of the self-selection constraints binds.
Which, if any, of these constraints bind depends on the relative values of the welfare
weights.10 Our assumption that λ1 > λ2 implies that the optimal tax problem is redis-
tributive, in the sense of Guesnerie (1995). That is, in the neighbourhood of the optimal
allocation, a redistribution of private consumption from the high-productivity individual
to the low-productivity individual and/or a redistribution of before-tax income from the
low-productivity individual to the high-productivity individual is socially desirable, but
would violate the incentive-compatibility constraints. As a consequence, it is optimal
for person two’s, but not person one’s, incentive-compatibility constraint to bind at the
solution to the optimal tax problem. Because bunching can only occur if both incentive
constraints bind, the individuals are not bunched.
Lemma 1. If (y˜1, y˜2, c˜1, c˜2, g˜) is a solution to the optimal nonlinear income tax problem
with y˜1 > 0, then
p(c˜1 + c˜2) + qg˜ = y˜1 + y˜2, (3.1)
w2v(c˜2, g˜)− γy˜2 = w2v(c˜1, g˜)− γy˜1, (3.2)
and
w1v(c˜1, g˜)− γy˜1 > w1v(c˜2, g˜)− γy˜2. (3.3)
Furthermore, the individuals are not bunched in this allocation.11
The optimal nonlinear income taxation problem can be solved in two steps. First,
the optimal values for the consumptions of the private and public goods are determined.
Then, using these values, the optimal incomes are obtained by simultaneously solving
(3.1) and (3.2).
The reduced-form objective function in the ﬁrst step is the function W : R3+ → R given
by
W (c1, c2, g) = β1v(c1, g) + β2v(c2, g)− γp(c1 + c2)− γqg, (3.4)
9Production ineﬃciency may be optimal when there are multiple budgets constraints. See, for exam-
ple, Cebreiro-Go´mez (2002).
10See Stiglitz (1983) for a detailed discussion of this issue.
11The standard proofs of Lemma 1 apply to models in which utility is not linear in before-tax income.
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where
β1 = w1 + (1− λ1)(w2 − w1) (3.5)
and
β2 = w2. (3.6)
The normalization λ1 + λ2 = 2 and the assumptions that λ1 > λ2 and w2 > w1 imply
that β2 > w1 > β1.
The description of the ﬁrst-stage reduced-form optimization problem is completed by
specifying the constraints on c1, c2, and g.
The Reduced-Form Optimization Problem. The government chooses (c1, c2, g) ∈
R
3
+ to maximize W (c1, c2, g) subject to the monotonicity constraint (2.11) on the private
consumptions.
Lemma 2 shows that the solution to the reduced-form optimization problem is unique
and that it is an unconstrained maximum of the reduced-form objective function W .
Lemma 2. There is a unique solution (c˜1, c˜2, g˜) to the reduced-form optimization prob-
lem. In this solution, c˜2 > c˜1 > 0 and g˜ > 0.
12
When the production-feasibility constraint and person two’s self-selection constraint
both bind, the value of the social welfare function W at the allocation (y1, y2, c1, c2, g) is
the same as the value of the reduced-form objective function W at (c1, c2, g).
Lemma 3. If (y1, y2, c1, c2, g) satisﬁes (3.1) and (3.2), then
W(y1, y2, c1, c2, g) = W (c1, c2, g). (3.7)
Proposition 1 shows that the optimal consumptions of the private and public goods
are obtained by solving the reduced-form optimization problem, with the optimal incomes
given by (3.8) and (3.9), provided that person one’s optimal income is positive.
Proposition 1. The allocation (y˜1, y˜2, c˜1, c˜2, g˜) is (i) a solution to the optimal nonlinear
income tax problem with y˜1 > 0 if and only if (ii) (c˜1, c˜2, g˜) solves the reduced-form
optimization problem,
y˜1 =
1
2
{
p
2∑
i=1
c˜i + qg˜ − 1
γ
w2[v(c˜2, g˜)− v(c˜1, g˜)]
}
> 0, (3.8)
12Because the solution to the reduced-form problem is strictly positive, in our comparative static
analysis, we simply say that v is strictly increasing and strictly concave without adding the proviso that
these properties of v only hold on R2++.
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and
y˜2 =
1
2
{
p
2∑
i=1
c˜i + qg˜ +
1
γ
w2[v(c˜2, g˜)− v(c˜1, g˜)]
}
. (3.9)
It follows from Proposition 1 and the fact that the reduced-form optimization problem
has a unique solution that there is also a unique solution to the optimal nonlinear income
tax problem.
The preceding results can be used to help interpret the weights β1 and β2 that ap-
pear in the reduced-form objective function. The wage wi measures the social value of
an additional unit of utility for person i obtained from the consumption of either the
private or the public good. In contrast, the weight βi measures the social value of an
additional unit of utility for person i from the consumption of these goods, adjusted for
the additional costs that this utility might impose through the tightening of an incentive-
compatibility constraint. Because person two’s incentive-compatibility constraint binds,
the direct gains to social welfare from an increase in person one’s private consumption are
partly oﬀset by the losses due to the tightening of the binding incentive constraint. For
this reason, β1 < w1. On the other hand, because person one’s incentive-compatibility
constraint does not bind, person two’s private consumption can be increased without
violating an incentive constraint, and so no adjustment to the social value of two’s utility
is needed; i.e., β2 = w2.
Because none of the constraints bind, the ﬁrst-order conditions for a solution to the
reduced-form optimization problem are given by
∂W (c1, c2, g)
∂ci
= βi
∂v(ci, g)
∂ci
− γp = 0, i = 1, 2, (3.10)
and
∂W (c1, c2, g)
∂g
= β1
∂v(c1, g)
∂g
+ β2
∂v(c2, g)
∂g
− γq = 0. (3.11)
These ﬁrst-order conditions have simple interpretations. For each person’s consumption
of the private good and for the public good, social marginal beneﬁt, suitably adjusted for
incentive eﬀects, is equated with social marginal cost. In the case of the public good, the
social marginal beneﬁt is obtained by adding each individual’s contribution to the social
beneﬁt, whereas with the private good, their social beneﬁts are considered separately.
Social marginal cost is measured in terms of utility. Hence, the social marginal cost of a
unit of the private (resp. public) good is equal to the value of the labour used to produce
that unit, p (resp. q), multiplied by the marginal disutility of labour in eﬃciency units,
γ.
The qualitative features of the optimal values for the marginal rates of income tax
and the rule governing the optimal provision of the public good can be obtained using
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the ﬁrst-order optimality conditions (3.10) and (3.11). Optimal income tax schedules
are non-diﬀerentiable when there are a ﬁnite number of individuals, so the marginal tax
rate faced by an individual is best deﬁned by considering a personalized, diﬀerentiable
tax schedule that results in the same choice of labour supply and private consumption
as is obtained with the actual anonymous tax schedule. If person i’s tax schedule were
smooth at his optimal choice, at the margin, for each additional dollar of before-tax
income, he would obtain an additional MRSiyc(yi, ci, g) units of the private good. The
value of this additional consumption is pMRSiyc(yi, ci, g). Hence, using (2.7), person i’s
eﬀective marginal tax rate is given by
MTRi(yi, ci, g) = 1− γp/wivci(ci, g), i = 1, 2. (3.12)
Because preferences are quasilinear, this tax rate only depends on i’s consumption of the
private and public goods.
It is well-known that when preferences are strictly quasiconcave, it is optimal in a
two-type economy for the low-productivity individual to face a marginal tax rate strictly
between zero and one and it is optimal for the high-productivity individual to face a
zero marginal tax rate. Further, as shown by Christiansen (1981, Proposition 1) and
Boadway and Keen (1993, Corollary 1), when preferences are weakly separable between
the consumption of the private and public goods and labour supply, the Samuelson
(1954) Rule for the optimal provision of the public good holds (the sum of the marginal
rates of substitution between public and private consumption should equal the marginal
rate of transformation between these two goods).13 These properties of the solution to
the optimal income tax problem are conﬁrmed in Proposition 2 for the economy with
quasilinear preferences considered here.
Proposition 2. If (y˜1, y˜2, c˜1, c˜2, g˜) is a solution to the optimal nonlinear income tax prob-
lem with y˜1 > 0, then
0 < MTR1(y˜1, c˜1, g˜) < 1, (3.13)
MTR2(y˜2, c˜2, g˜) = 0, (3.14)
and
MRS1gc(y˜1, c˜1, g˜) + MRS
2
gc(y˜2, c˜2, g˜) = −
q
p
. (3.15)
13In the absence of the separability assumption, an additional term is added to the right-hand side of
(3.15) that takes account of the diﬀerence between the two individuals’ marginal rates of substitution at
person one’s commodity bundle. We follow Christiansen (1981) and Boadway and Keen (1993) by using
private consumption as the numeraire good. The form of the optimality condition for the public good is
diﬀerent if, as in Mirrlees (1976) and Tuomala (1990), before-tax income is used as the numeraire; i.e.,
if the marginal rates of substitution in the optimality condition are between public good consumption
and before-tax income. See Boadway and Keen (1993) for a detailed discussion of the numeraire issue.
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4. A Comparative Static Matrix
The optimal allocation, and hence the choice of an optimal tax schedule, depends on
the underlying parameters of the economy. In our model, these exogenous variables are
(i) the preference parameter γ, which measures the onerousness of labour eﬀort, (ii) the
producer prices p and q, which characterize the production technology, (iii) the skill levels
w1 and w2 of the two individuals, and (iv) the weights λ1 and λ2 in the social welfare
function. We are interested in determining the qualitative properties of how the optimal
allocation varies in response to marginal changes in these parameters.
Weymark (1987) analyzed the comparative static properties of the optimal allocation
for a multi-person version of our model in which there is no public good. When there is no
public good, the analogue to the ﬁrst-order condition (3.10) can be solved explicitly for
person i’s optimal consumption. Having explicit solutions for the optimal consumptions
greatly facilitates the analysis of the comparative static properties of Weymark’s model.
Without a speciﬁc functional form for v, it is not possible to explicitly solve the ﬁrst-
order conditions (3.10) and (3.11) for the optimal allocation of the private and public
goods. Nevertheless, the simplicity of the ﬁrst-order conditions allows for a tractable
analysis of the eﬀects of changes in the parameters of our model of the economy on
these variables. In the reduced-form optimization problem, the skill levels w1 and w2 and
the welfare weights λ1 and λ2 only aﬀect the optimal choice of the private and public
consumptions through their eﬀect on the adjusted welfare weights β1 and β2. In this
section, we derive formulae that describe how to optimally change the three consumption
variables in response to a marginal increase in p, q, γ, β1, and β2. These formulae are
used in subsequent sections to determine the qualitative comparative static properties of
our model.
For any positive values of the parameters q, p, γ, β1, and β2, we know from Lemma 2
that the reduced-form problem has a unique solution and that the optimal values for the
three consumption variables are positive. Let F : R5++ → R3++ be the function mapping
(q, p, γ, β1, β2) to the optimal choice of (c1, c2, g). Let c
∗
1 : R
5
++ → R++, c∗2 : R5++ →
R++, and g
∗ : R5++ → R++ denote the three component functions of F . Thus, for all
(q, p, γ, β1, β2) ∈ R5++,
F (q, p, γ, β1, β2) = [c
∗
1(q, p, γ, β1, β2), c
∗
2(q, p, γ, β1, β2), g
∗(q, p, γ, β1, β2)]. (4.1)
In Proposition 3, we show that F is continuously diﬀerentiable and provide formulae for
the partial derivatives of F .
Proposition 3. The solution function F : R5++ → R3++ of the reduced-form optimization
problem is continuously diﬀerentiable. For all (q, p, γ, β1, β2) ∈ R5++, the derivative DF
of F at (q, p, γ, β1, β2) is given by
DF (q, p, γ, β1, β2) = (A
−1B)(q, p, γ, β1, β2), (4.2)
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where
A(q, p, γ, β1, β2) =


β1vc1c1(c1, g) 0 β1vc1g(c1, g)
0 β2vc2c2(c2, g) β2vc2g(c2, g)
β1vc1g(c1, g) β2vc2g(c2, g) β1vgg(c1, g) + β2vgg(c2, g)

 (4.3)
and
B(q, p, γ, β1, β2) =


0 γ p −vc1(c1, g) 0
0 γ p 0 −vc2(c2, g)
γ 0 q −vg(c1, g) −vg(c2, g)

 . (4.4)
Henceforth, the dependence of matrices and functions on the values of the arguments
at which they are evaluated is suppressed in our notation. When necessary to avoid
abiguities by doing so, we index derivatives with respect to g by the individual concerned.
Thus,
vgi = vg(ci, g) and vgigi = vgg(ci, g), i = 1, 2. (4.5)
We also let
µ = β1vgg(c1, g) + β2vgg(c2, g). (4.6)
The entries in the matrix DF in Proposition 3 are the partial derivatives of the
solution functions c∗1, c
∗
2, and g
∗ of the reduced-form optimization problem with respect
to the ﬁve parameters. Our objective is to sign these partial derivatives. In order to do
so, we need to ﬁnd an explicit solution to (4.2).
Using the well-known formula for the inverse of a 3× 3 matrix, we obtain
A−1 =
1
|A|


β2vc2c2µ− (β2vc2g)2 β1β2vc1gvc2g −β1β2vc2c2vc1g
β1β2vc1gvc2g β1vc1c1µ− (β1vc1g)2 −β1β2vc1c1vc2g
−β1β2vc2c2vc1g −β1β2vc1c1vc2g β1β2vc1c1vc2c2

 . (4.7)
Using (4.7), the matrix A−1B can now be computed. Because A−1B is quite large, we
present it column-by-column, with the following partition:
A−1B =
[
A−1B(q) A−1B(p) A−1B(γ) A−1B(β1) A
−1B(β2)
]
, (4.8)
where
A−1B(q) =
1
|A|


−γβ1β2vc2c2vc1g
−γβ1β2vc1c1vc2g
γβ1β2vc1c1vc2c2

 , (4.9)
A−1B(p) =
1
|A|


γ{β2vc2c2µ− (β2vc2g)2 + β1β2vc1gvc2g}
γ{β1vc1c1µ− (β1vc1g)2 + β1β2vc1gvc2g}
−γ{β1β2vc1c1vc2g + β1β2vc2c2vc1g}

 , (4.10)
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A−1B(γ) =
1
|A|


p{β2vc2c2µ− (β2vc2g)2 + β1β2vc1gvc2g} − qβ1β2vc2c2vc1g
p{β1vc1c1µ− (β1vc1g)2 + β1β2vc1gvc2g} − qβ1β2vc1c1vc2g
−p{β1β2vc2c2vc1g + β1β2cc1c1vc2g}+ qβ1β2vc1c1vc2c2

 , (4.11)
A−1B(β1) =
1
|A|


−vc1{β2vc2c2µ− (β2vc2g)2}+ vg1β1β2vc2c2vc1g
−vc1β1β2vc1gvc2g + vg1β1β2vc1c1vc2g
vc1β1β2vc2c2vc1g − vg1β1β2vc1c1vc2c2

 , (4.12)
and
A−1B(β2) =
1
|A|


−vc2β1β2vc1gvc2g + vg2β1β2vc2c2vc1g
−vc2{β1vc1c1µ− (β1vc1g)2}+ vg2β1β2vc1c1vc2g
vc2β1β2vc1c1vc2g − vg2β1β2vc1c1vc2c2

 . (4.13)
Each column in the partition of A−1B in (4.8) contains the comparative static in-
formation with respect to the parameter for which the column is labelled. The rows of
A−1B contain the comparative static information for c∗1, c
∗
2, and g
∗, respectively. In the
next two sections, we investigate the signs of the entries in the comparative static matrix
A−1B. Note that each of these entries contains a common factor, 1/|A|. In the course of
proving Proposition 3, we have shown that |A| is negative.
5. Comparative Statics for the Technology and Preference Pa-
rameters
Henceforth, let (q¯, p¯, γ¯, λ¯1, λ¯2, w¯1, w¯2) ∈ R7++ denote the initial values of the parameters
that appear in our model and let a¯ = (y¯1, y¯2, c¯1, c¯2, g¯) denote the corresponding optimal
allocation. We suppose that y¯1 (and, hence, every component of a¯) is positive. For each
of the parameters, our objective is to determine the direction of change in each of the
components of the optimal allocation and in person one’s marginal tax rate induced by
a marginal increase in the value of the parameter.14 Our strategy is to use the compar-
ative static matrix A−1B from Section 4 to sign the directions of change in the optimal
consumptions of the private and public goods, (3.8) and (3.9) to sign the directions of
change in the optimal before-tax incomes, and (3.12) to sign the direction of change
in person one’s marginal tax rate.15 By making assumptions about how the marginal
valuation of the public good varies in response to a change in the consumption of the
private good, for each of our parameters, we are able to obtain comparative static results
for the consumption variables. Unfortunately, our model yields only a few unambiguous
comparative statics for the income variables and for person one’s marginal tax rate.
In this section, we investigate the impact of marginal changes in the technology pa-
rameters p and q and the taste parameter γ on the solution to the optimal nonlinear
14Recall from Proposition 2 that it is always optimal for person two to face a zero marginal tax rate.
15Note that if an individual’s skill level is not the parameter being changed, his before-tax income
increases if and only if his labour supply increases.
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income tax problem and on person one’s marginal tax rate. Because the welfare weights
and skill levels are being held ﬁxed, it follows from (3.5) and (3.6) that the initial values
of the adjusted welfare weights, β¯1 and β¯2, are also being held constant.
5.1. Changing the Price of the Public Good
The considerable growth of the public sector in Western democracies from the end of
the Second World War until the 1980s led some commentators to argue that the cost
of government services increased relative to the cost of private sector activities over this
period. In Canada, for example, the price index for government consumption increased
faster than the overall price index from 1961 to 1990.16 In our model, the implications
of such a trend on optimal tax policy can be captured by considering the impact that a
change in the producer price q of the public good has on the optimal allocation. Given the
separability of preferences, the provision of the public good has no direct redistributive
eﬀects, so our comparative static results for changes in q can be interpreted more broadly
as identifying the eﬀects of an increase in the cost of non-redistributive programmes on
the structure of the government’s redistributive and non-redistributive programmes.
Proposition 4 presents our comparative static results for a change in the price of the
public good.
Proposition 4. If person one’s income is positive in the initial optimal allocation, then
a marginal increase in the price q of the public good results in
(i) a decrease in the optimal provision of the public good,
(ii) an increase in person i’s optimal consumption of the private good if and only if
i’s marginal utility of private consumption is decreasing in the consumption of the
public good at the initial allocation, i = 1, 2, and
(iii) no change in the marginal income tax rate faced by person one.
The conclusion in part (i) of Proposition 4 is as one would expect. If the public good
becomes more expensive, it is optimal to provide less of it.
Because of the separability in the reduced-form objective function, part (ii) of Propo-
sition 4 can be interpreted using a ﬁrst-best style of reasoning. For concreteness, consider
the case in which the marginal utility of i’s private consumption decreases with an in-
crease in the provision of the public good. Recall from the discussion of (3.10) that at
(c¯i, g¯), the social marginal beneﬁt of an increase in person i’s private consumption is β¯ivci
and the social marginal cost is γ¯p¯. Because the values of β1, γ, and p are unaﬀected by
a change in the price of the public good, if i’s consumption of the private good is held
ﬁxed when the provision of the public good falls in response to an increase in its price,
16According to Statistics Canada (1998, Table 26, pp. 199–217), the ratio of the implicit price index
of current government expenditure to the overall GDP deﬂator rose from 0.69 to 0.98 during this period.
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then the social marginal beneﬁt of i’s private consumption exceeds it social marginal
cost. Therefore, it is optimal to increase i’s consumption of this good.
The conclusion in part (iii) of Proposition 4 that person one’s marginal tax rate (not
just the marginal tax rate of person two) is unaﬀected by a change in the price of the
public good is quite striking. The reasoning used to establish this result applies to both
individuals. An implication of (3.10), the requirement the social marginal beneﬁt of an
individual’s private consumption should equal its social marginal cost, is that
∂v(c∗i (q, p, γ, β1, β2), g
∗(q, p, γ, β1, β2))
∂ci
=
γp
βi
, i = 1, 2. (5.1)
Because the right-hand side of (5.1) does not depend on q, neither does its left-hand side.
As a consequence, adjustments made to an individual’s consumption of the private and
public goods owing to a change in the price of the public good exactly oﬀset each other
in their eﬀects on the marginal utility of his private consumption. Hence, from (3.12),
there is no change in the marginal tax rate.
Except in special cases, it is not possible to sign the eﬀects on the optimal incomes
of an increase in the price of the public good. Suppose that a marginal change in g
has no aﬀect on either individual’s marginal utility of private consumption at the initial
allocation. We know that in this case, it is optimal to decrease public good provision
when q increases, but not to change private consumption. If the marginal utility of private
consumption does not change at any level of consumption (not just at c¯1 and c¯2) when
we decrease the public good level to its new optimal level, then by (2.7), the indiﬀerence
curves in income-private consumption space remain the same. As a consequence, person
two’s incentive-compability constraint still binds when g is decreased holding the other
components of the allocation ﬁxed. Thus, only the middle term in the equations for the
optimal incomes, (3.8) and (3.9), is aﬀected by the increase in q. Because preferences are
quasilinear, to satisfy the production-feasiblity constraint with equality, the incomes of
both individuals need to be increased (resp. decreased) by a common amount if the total
cost qg of the public good has increased (resp. decreased).
If, however, the marginal utility of private consumption does change for some con-
sumption levels diﬀerent from c¯1 and c¯2 (but not at c¯1 and c¯2), then the indiﬀerence curves
in income-private consumption space change when g is decreased, and two’s incentive-
compatability constraint need not bind (nor even be satisﬁed). Thus, in this case, the
value of the third term in (3.8) and (3.9) may not be invariant to a change in g. Holding
y1 at its initial value, y2 must be increased (resp. decreased) to restore the satisfaction
of two’s incentive constraint with equality if the last term in (3.9) has increased (resp.
decreased) before implementing a common change in the two incomes in order to satisfy
the production-feasibility constraint with equality.
If a change in g does aﬀect either individual’s marginal utility of private consumption
at the initial allocation, then it becomes necessary to take account of all of the terms
in (3.8) and (3.9) when determining how the optimal incomes change. That is, when g
decreases, we need to know what happens to the total cost of both private and public
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consumption and we need to know which responds more to the change in g, vc1 or vc2 .
There is no reason, in general, for these eﬀects to reinforce one another.
5.2. Changing the Price of the Private Good
In a version of our model without public good provision, Weymark (1987, Theorem 1) has
shown that an increase in the producer price of the consumption good leads to a reduction
in each person’s consumption. Because preferences are quasilinear, there are no income
eﬀects associated with a change in p. Hence, as the opportunity cost of consumption in
terms of leisure increases, it is optimal to economize on consumption. The situation is
more complex in an economy with a public good for two reasons. First, an increase in
the price of private consumption makes the public good relatively less expensive. At the
same time, changes in private consumption may induce changes in the marginal valuation
of the public good. Thus, the eﬀect of an increase in p on the provision of the public good
is not obvious. Moreover, the eﬀects on private consumption need to be re-examined,
especially if the provision of the public good aﬀects the marginal utility of consumption.
Proposition 5 shows that it is possible to sign the eﬀects on the consumptions of both
goods when p increases provided that the signs of the change in the marginal valuation
of the public good when private consumption increases are not diﬀerent for the two
individuals at the initial allocation.
Proposition 5. If person one’s income is positive in the initial optimal allocation, then
a marginal increase in the price p of the private good results in
(i) a decrease in each person’s optimal consumption of the private good and a decrease
in the optimal provision of the public good if the marginal valuation of the pub-
lic good is nondecreasing in private consumption at the initial allocation for both
individuals and it is strictly increasing for at least one individual,
(ii) a decrease in each person’s optimal consumption of the private good and an in-
crease in the optimal provision of the public good if the marginal valuation of the
public good is nonincreasing in private consumption at the initial allocation for both
individuals and it is strictly decreasing for at least one individual, and
(iii) a decrease in each person’s optimal consumption of the private good and no change
in the optimal provision of the public good if the marginal valuation of the public
good is independent of private consumption at the initial allocation for both indi-
viduals.
In each of the three cases considered, an increase in the price of the private good
results in a decrease in each person’s optimal private consumption, just like in the model
without the public good. Thus, the direct eﬀect on private consumption of increasing
the cost of the private good dominates any indirect eﬀects caused by a change in the
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provision of the public good. Consider changing the private consumptions to their new
lower optimal levels holding the quantity of the public good ﬁxed. From (3.11), because
the social marginal cost of the public good has not changed, we see that it is necessary to
adjust g so as to restore the social marginal beneﬁt of the public good to its original level.
If, for example, the change in the marginal valuation of the public good induced by the
reduction in private consumption is negative for both individuals, g must be adjusted so
as to increase the social marginal beneﬁt of the public good. Because v is strictly concave,
this requires decreasing the provision of the public good. If these marginal valuations
move in opposite directions, the overall eﬀect on the social marginal beneﬁt of the public
good from reducing the private consumptions is indeterminate.
Proposition 5 is silent not only about the eﬀects of a change in p on the optimal
provision of the public good, but also about the implications for the optimal values of
the private consumptions if the sign of the eﬀect of an increase in private consumption
on the marginal valuation of the public good diﬀers between the two individuals. The
reason for this ambiguity is clear from (5.1). For each individual i, because βi and γ are
constant on the right-hand side of (5.1), the changes in the optimal allocation of public
and private goods owing to an increase in p must result in an increase in the marginal
utility of private consumption for both individuals. There are two means by which vci can
be increased: (i) by a decrease in private consumption or (ii) by a change in public good
provision, the sign of which depends on the sign of vcig at the intial allocation. Suppose,
for the sake of argument, that vc1g < 0 and vc2g > 0 at the initial allocation, and that an
increase in p leads to a reduction in c1. This results in a higher valuation of the public
good by person one, which, all else equal, would tend to increase the optimal level of
public good provision. This, in turn, results in an increase in the marginal valuation of
consumption for person two. This increase may be of suﬃcient magnitude to ensure that
(5.1) holds without a decrease in c2.
As Weymark (1987) has shown, even without the public good, it is not possible to sign
the eﬀects of a change in p on the before-tax incomes. The situation does not improve
with the presence of a public good. Nor is it possible to sign what happens to person
one’s marginal tax rate when p increases. Such a change increases the numerator in the
fraction that appears in (3.12). However, as we have just seen, person one’s marginal
utility of consumption also increases, thereby increasing the denominator in this fraction.
As a consequence, the overall eﬀect on his marginal tax rate is indeterminate.
5.3. Changing the Preference Parameter
Except for the last term in the reduced-form objective function (3.4), the taste parameter
γ and the price p of the private good play symmetric roles. For this reason, in the
absence of the public good, Weymark (1987) found that the comparative static eﬀects on
consumption are the same for both γ and p. However, the presence of the public good
introduces an asymmetry between these two parameters, and this makes the analysis more
complex. When p increases, only the the cost of producing the private good increases.
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However, when γ increases, the production of both goods becomes more onerous.
Proposition 6 summarizes our ﬁndings about the eﬀects of an increase in γ on the
optimal allocation.
Proposition 6. If person one’s income is positive in the initial optimal allocation, then
a marginal increase in the preference parameter γ results in a decrease in each person’s
optimal consumption of the private good, a decrease in the optimal provision of the public
good, and a decrease in the optimal aggregate before-tax income if the marginal valuation
of the public good is nondecreasing in private consumption at the initial allocation for
both individuals.
As (5.1) indicates, each person’s marginal utility of private consumption must increase
when γ increases, just as is the case when p increases. But now we must also increase the
social marginal beneﬁt of the public good in order to satisfy (3.11), for which a suﬃcient
condition is that each person’s marginal valuation of the public good increases.
First, consider the case in which the marginal valuations of the public good are
independent of private consumption for both individuals. In order to increase the social
marginal beneﬁt of the public good, it is then necessary to decrease its provision. By
Young’s Theorem, this has no eﬀect on either individual’s marginal utilty of private
consumption. Hence, to increase these marginal utilities, the private consumptions must
decrease as well.
If these marginal valuations are both increasing in private consumption, decreasing
the quantity of the public good lowers the marginal utilities of private consumption,
thereby reinforcing the need to decrease both private consumptions in order to increase
their social marginal values. Similarly, decreasing the consumptions of the private good
reinforces the need to decrease the provision of the public good so as to increase its social
marginal value. On the other hand, if these marginal valuations are both decreasing in
private consumption, then the indirect eﬀect of decreasing ci (resp. g) on vg (resp. vci) is
positive, as required. But then it is indeterminate whether a decrease in g (resp. vci) is
still needed for the overall eﬀect on vg (resp. vci) to be positive.
For the case considered in Proposition 6, it is optimal to reduce the production of
both the private and public goods. Because the parameters of the technology are being
held ﬁxed, in order to keep the production-feasibility constraint binding, it is therefore
necessary to reduce the aggregate labour supply in eﬃciency units; i.e., the sum of the
before-tax incomes must decrease. However, it is not possible to determine whether both
individuals reduce their labour supply or not.
The parameters γ and p enter symmetrically into the formulae for the marginal tax
rates in (3.12). Thus, the reasoning used to show why the eﬀect of an increase in p on
person one’s marginal tax rate is indeterminate also applies for an increase in γ.
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6. Comparative Statics for the Skill Levels and Welfare Weights
In this section, we investigate the comparative static properties of changes in the skill
levels and the relative social welfare weights. From the deﬁnitions of the adjusted welfare
weights (3.5) and (3.6), the ﬁrst-order conditions for the reduced-form problem (3.10) and
(3.11), and the expressions for the optimal incomes (3.8) and (3.9), it can be seen that
the eﬀects of these parameters are mediated through their eﬀects on the adjusted welfare
weights β1 and β2, with changes in person’s one’s skill level and in the relative welfare
weights only aﬀecting β1 and changes in person two’s skill level aﬀfecting both β1 and
β2. We begin by considering the parameters that only inﬂuence the optimal allocation
through their eﬀects on β1.
6.1. Changing Person One’s Skill Level and the Relative Welfare Weights
As a preliminary step in our analysis, we determine what can be said about the compar-
ative static properties of β1 without knowing whether the change in β1 is due to a change
in w1 or λ1.
17 If there is no public good, Weymark (1987, Proposition 5) has shown that
an increase in an individual’s adjusted welfare weight increases that person’s optimal
consumption, but does not aﬀect anybody else’s consumption. The reason is that the
terms containing the adjusted welfare weights in the ﬁrst-order conditions for private
consumption are independent of each other. However, in the presence of a public good,
these expressions may not be independent because, as (3.10) demonstrates, the quantity
of the public good may aﬀect everyone’s marginal utility of private consumption. As
a consequence, the comparative static analysis of an increase in person one’s adjusted
welfare weight is more complex when there is a public good than when there is not.
The comparative static properties of an increase in β1 are presented in Proposition 7.
Proposition 7. If person one’s income is positive and his marginal valuation of the
public good is nondecreasing in private consumption at the initial optimal allocation,
then a marginal increase in person one’s adjusted welfare weight β1 results in
(i) an increase in the optimal provision of the public good,
(ii) an increase in person one’s optimal consumption of the private good,
(iii) an increase in person two’s optimal consumption of the private good if and only if
person two has a marginal valuation of the public good that is increasing in private
consumption at the initial allocation, and
17Recall that the welfare weights have been normalized so that λ2 is completely determined by λ1.
Because β2 = w2 and w2 also helps determine the value of β1, it is not possible to change β2 without
also changing the value of β1. Therefore, except in the proof of Proposition 9, we do not consider the
comparative statics of an independent change in β2.
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(iv) an increase in the optimal aggregate before-tax income if person two has a marginal
valuation of the public good that is nondecreasing in private consumption at the
initial allocation.
An increase in the adjusted welfare weight β1 of person one has no eﬀect on the social
marginal cost of either the private or public good in the reduced-form problem. Fur-
thermore, at the initial allocation, raising β1 increases both the social marginal beneﬁt of
one’s private consumption and of the public good, but has no eﬀect on the social marginal
beneﬁt of person two’s private consumption. Because the social marginal beneﬁts of per-
son one’s private consumption and of the public good exceed their social marginal costs
at the initial allocation, one would expect that it is optimal to increase both of these
variables. Proposition 7 validates this intuition provided that person one’s marginal
valuation of the public good is nondecreasing in his private consumption at the initial
allocation.
In order to satisfy the ﬁrst-order conditions (3.10) and (3.11), it is necessary to reduce
person one’s marginal utility of consumption and hold constant person two’s marginal
utility of consumption when β1 is increased. It is also necessary to adjust the two individ-
uals’ marginal valuations of the public good so as to restore the social marginal beneﬁt
of the public good to its original value. If the marginal valuations of the public good are
independent of private consumption for both individuals, the only way to achieve these
objectives is to increase both c1 and g and to not change c2.
If, however, the marginal valuations of the public good are not independent of private
consumption, we also need to take account of the indirect eﬀects of changing ci (resp. g)
on vgi (resp. vci). If vc1g is positive, raising g increases vc1 , which necessitates an increase
in c1 in order to lower this marginal utility below its original value. On the other hand,
if contrary to our assumption, vc1g is negative, then raising g decreases vc1 , and it is
no longer clear whether we need to increase or decrease c1 in order to equate the social
marginal beneﬁt and social marginal cost of one’s private consumption. These conclusions
are reinforced by considering the eﬀects of increasing c1 on the optimal provision of the
public good. If vc1g is positive, raising c1 further increases the social marginal beneﬁt of
the public good, which, for ﬁxed c2, requires increasing g to restore the equality between
the social marginal beneﬁt and the social marginal cost of the public good. On the other
hand, if vc1g is negative, it is not clear how g must be changed to restore this equality.
Of course, we also need to consider possible changes in the value of c2. Proposition
7 shows that the indirect eﬀects of changing c2 are never strong enough to reverse our
conclusion that g should be increased. Because g is increased, in order to oﬀset its
eﬀect on vc2 , c2 must be increased if and only if the marginal utility of person two’s
private consumption is increasing in g, which, by Young’s Theorem, is equivalent to the
statement in part (iii) of the Proposition.
For the case considered in part (iv), it is optimal to increase the production of both the
private and the public good. Because the parameters of the technology have not changed,
this necessitates an increase in the supply of labour in eﬃciency units or, equivalently,
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an increase in the sum of the before-tax incomes.
Because β2 = w2, from the deﬁnition of β1 in (3.5), we see that an increase in w1 or a
decrease in λ1 (with a compensating increase in λ2 to keep their sum constant) leads to
an increase in β1, but does not aﬀect the value of β2. Moreover, changes in w1 or λ1 only
inﬂuence the optimal consumptions of the private and public goods through the eﬀects
they have on β1. Thus, all of the comparative static results presented in Proposition 7
also hold for an increase in w1 or a decrease in λ1.
When the increase in β1 is due solely to a decrease in λ1, we can say somewhat more.
From the ﬁrst-order condition (3.10), we know that vc1 must decrease to compensate for
the increase in β1. Thus, from (3.12), person one’s marginal tax rate must decrease.
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The set of feasible utility pairs (u1, u2) does not depend on the welfare weights. With a
weighted utilitarian social welfare function, it cannot be optimal to make person one bet-
ter oﬀ if the relative weight on his utility is decreased. When λ1 is decreased, we know
that it is optimal to increase person one’s consumption of both goods if his marginal
valuation of the public good is nondecreasing in private consumption at the initial op-
timal allocation. Thus, in order not to increase his utility, he must work more; i.e., his
before-tax income must increase. The eﬀect of changing λ1 on person two’s income is
ambiguous. Person two must be no worse oﬀ, but because his consumption of the public
good increases, changes in either direction in his private consumption and before-tax
income are compatible with an increase his utility.19
The preceding discussion is summarized in Proposition 8.
Proposition 8. If person one’s income is positive and his marginal valuation of the
public good is nondecreasing in private consumption at the initial optimal allocation,
then the comparative static results presented in Proposition 7 for a marginal increase in
β1 also hold for a marginal increase in person one’s skill level w1 or a marginal decrease
in his welfare weight λ1. Furthermore, a marginal decrease in λ1 results in
(i) a decrease in person one’s marginal tax rate and
(ii) an increase in person one’s optimal before-tax income if his marginal valuation
of the public good is nondecreasing in private consumption at the initial optimal
allocation.
6.2. Changing Person Two’s Skill Level
Because it is optimal for the incentive-compatibility constraint of person two, but not
person one, to bind, the two skill levels, w1 and w2, enter asymmetrically in the reduced-
form objective function (3.4); w1 only aﬀects the value of β1, whereas w2 aﬀects the values
18If w1 increases, it is not possible to sign the direction of change in this marginal tax rate because
the two terms in the denominator of the fraction in (3.12) move in opposite directions.
19If there is no public good, as previously noted, when β1 is increased, it is optimal not to change
person two’s consumption. Thus, as Weymark (1987) has formally shown, to make person two better
oﬀ, his before-tax income must fall.
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of both β1 and β2. As can be seen from (3.5) and (3.6), a change in w2 moves β1 and β2
in opposite directions, rendering the eﬀects of a change in w2 on the optimal allocation
diﬃcult to sign. A simple description of the comparative static properties of w2 only
appears to be available for the special case in which private and public consumption are
additively separable in the utility function. Proposition 9 presents our comparative static
results for a change in person two’s skill level for this special case.
Proposition 9. If person one’s income is positive and the function v is additively sep-
arable, then a marginal increase in person two’s skill level w2 results in
(i) an increase in the optimal provision of the public good,
(ii) a decrease in person one’s optimal consumption of the private good,
(iii) an increase in person two’s optimal consumption of the private good, and
(iv) an increase in person one’s marginal tax rate.
With additively separable preferences, the consumption of the public good has no
eﬀect on the marginal utility of private consumption. Because an increase in w2 decreases
β1 (resp. increases β2), it is necessary to decrease c1 (resp. increase c2) in order to raise
vc1 (resp. lower vc2) so that the social marginal beneﬁts of these goods are held constant,
as required by the ﬁrst-order condition (3.10). Because p, γ, and w1 are being held ﬁxed,
increasing vc1 also increases person one’s marginal tax rate.
The intuition for the eﬀect of a change on w2 on the optimal provision of the public
good is less straightforward. Because private consumption has no eﬀect on the marginal
valuations of the public good, the level of provision of this good is the only instrument
available to keep the marginal social beneﬁt of the public good from changing when w2 is
increased, as required by the ﬁrst-order condition (3.11). Because both individuals have
the same additively-separable utility function for the two consumption goods, they also
have the same marginal valuation of the public good. As a consequence, the provision
of the public good should be increased if and only if the sum β1 + β2 of the adjusted
welfare weights is increased. Because ∂β1/∂w2 = 1 − λ1 and ∂β2/∂w2 = 1, an increase
in w2 increases the overall social marginal value of the public good. Thus, provision of
the public good should be increased.
It is clear from the preceding discussion that the additive separability of v plays
an important role in establishing part (i) of Proposition 9. For more general utility
functions, even if the results described in parts (ii) and (iii) continue to hold, the net
eﬀect of changing the private consumptions on the social marginal valuation of the public
good is diﬃcult to sign, even in the absence of the resulting feedbacks on the marginal
utility of consumption.
Even with additively separable preferences, it is not possible to determine how the
before-tax incomes should change when w2 is increased. Parts (ii) and (iii) of Proposition
9 together with the separability assumption imply that the last term in (3.8) and (3.9)
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increases. Part (i) of Proposition 9 implies that the second term in these expressions also
increases. However, because it is optimal to move c1 and c2 in opposite directions, the
sign of the ﬁrst term is indeterminate.
7. Concluding Remarks
A natural extension of our analysis would be to consider more types of individuals. Wey-
mark (1987) has provided fairly extensive comparative static results for an arbitrary ﬁnite
number of skill levels when there is no public good. There are grounds for believing that
some unambiguous comparative statics can also be obtained for a multi-type version of
our model. With more types, it remains optimal for the production-feasibility constraint
to bind and, if the welfare weights are declining in skill level, it is also optimal for all
the adjacent downward self-selection constraints to bind. This permits us to solve for
the optimal values of the private and public goods using a reduced-form optimization
problem. The objective function in this problem has the same general form as here; we
simply add a social beneﬁt term for each additional type and replace c1 +c2 with the sum
of the individual private consumptions. An individual’s adjusted welfare weight would
now depend on the sum of his welfare weight and the welfare weights of all individuals
of lower ability. Provided that there is no bunching at the initial optimal allocation, the
ﬁrst-order optimality conditions for private consumption have the same form as in (3.10),
and the ﬁrst-order optimality condition for public good provision has an additional term
for each additional type.
The comparative static properties of our model for the consumptions of the private
and public goods are contained in the comparative static matrix A−1B given in (4.8).
Except for the last row and column, the A matrix only has non-zero entries on the
main diagonal. Similarly, the B matrix contains a submatrix that only has non-zero
entries on its main diagonal. These properties of A and B carry over to their multi-type
analogues. It is the sparseness of these matrices that suggests that some of our results
can be generalized to more skill types.
Although our theorems carry over quite straightforwardly to an arbitrary number
of individuals of each type, by not explicitly including the number of each type in our
model, we are unable to consider how the optimal allocation or the marginal tax rate of
the low-skilled individuals varies with respect to a change in the distribution of types. As
noted in Section 1, in models without a public good, Hamilton and Pestieau (2002) and
Boadway and Pestieau (2004) have analyzed the impact of changing the skill distribution
on, respectively, the individual utilities and the utility possibilities frontier. It would be
of interest to see how changing the proportions of each type aﬀects the optimal allocation
and the optimal marginal tax rates both with and without public good provision.
An obvious limitation of our analysis is the restriction to quasilinear preferences. If
the two consumption goods are not separable from labour in the utility function, then the
Samuelson Rule for the optimal provision of the public good no longer holds. However,
before attempting to generalize our model to non-separable preferences, it seems prudent
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to ﬁrst try to obtain comparative static results for a non-separable preference version of
the private good model considered by Weymark (1987). When the social welfare function
is an increasing, symmetric, and concave function of the individual utilities, Ro¨ell (1985)
has shown that it is optimal for the downward self-selection constraints to bind. It is
also optimal for the production-feasibility constraint to bind. Thus, in principle, it is
possible to use these binding constraints to solve for the optimal incomes as a function
of the optimal consumptions, and thereby obtain a reduced-form problem to solve for
the optimal consumptions. The resulting reduced-form objective function would not,
in general, be additively separable in the consumption variables, which would preclude
obtaining explicit solutions for the optimal consumptions in terms of the underlying
parameters of the model, as in Weymark (1987). Nevertheless, techniques similar to
those employed here could be used to see if the ﬁrst-order conditions of the reduced-form
problem yield any unambiguous comparative statics.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. (i) We ﬁrst show that the production-feasibility contraint binds. By
assumption, a˜ = (y˜1, y˜2, c˜1, c˜2, g˜) satisﬁes (2.3). Suppose, contrary to (3.1), that
p(c˜1 + c˜2) + qg˜ < y˜1 + y˜2. (A.1)
Because y˜1 > 0, it follows from (2.12) that y˜2 > 0. Hence, there then exists a δ > 0 such
that
p(c˜1 + c˜2) + qg˜ ≤ (y˜1 − δ) + (y˜2 − δ). (A.2)
Consider the allocation aˆ = (yˆ1, yˆ2, cˆ1, cˆ2, gˆ) = (y˜1−δ, y˜2−δ, c˜1, c˜2, g˜). By (A.2), aˆ satisﬁes
(2.3). Because a˜ satisﬁes (2.9) and (2.10), by (2.6), aˆ also satisﬁes these two constraints.
Hence, by (2.6) and (2.15),
W(aˆ)−W(a˜) = (λ1 + λ2)δ > 0, (A.3)
which contradicts the optimality of a˜.
(ii) Next, we show that the higher-productivity individual’s self-selection constraint
binds. By assumption, a˜ satisﬁes (2.10). Suppose, by way of contradiction to (3.2), that
w2v(c˜2, g˜)− γy˜2 > w2v(c˜1, g˜)− γy˜1. (A.4)
Because y˜1 > 0, there exists an ε > 0 such that
w2v(c˜2, g˜)− γ(y˜2 + ε) ≥ w2v(c˜1, g˜)− γ(y˜1 − ε). (A.5)
Consider the allocation aˆ = (yˆ1, yˆ2, cˆ1, cˆ2, gˆ) = (y˜1 − ε, y˜2 + ε, c˜1, c˜2, g˜). Because utility is
decreasing in income and a˜ satisﬁes (2.9), so does aˆ. Because a˜ satisﬁes (2.3) and total
income is unchanged, aˆ also satisﬁes (2.3). By (2.6) and (2.15),
W(aˆ)−W(a˜) = (λ1 − λ2)ε > 0, (A.6)
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which contradicts the optimality of a˜.
(iii) While it is possible to provide a direct proof that the low-productivity individual’s
self-selection contraint does not bind, an indirect proof is simpler. In the course of proving
Proposition 1, we show that (3.3) holds. The no-bunching result follows immediately from
(3.2) and (3.3).
Proof of Lemma 2. Because the partial derivatives of v approach inﬁnity as either argu-
ment goes to zero, if (c˜1, c˜2, g˜) solves the reduced-form problem, then c˜1, c˜2, and g˜ are
positive. Because the reduced-form objective function is strictly concave on R2++ and
continuous on R2+, the partial derivatives of v approach zero as either argument goes
to inﬁnity, and the constraint set in the reduced-form optimization problem is deﬁned
by linear inequalities, this problem has a unique solution. An immediate implication of
the fact that β2 > β1 is that the monotonicity constraint (2.11) does not bind at the
optimum.
Proof of Lemma 3. Because a = (y1, y2, c1, c2, g) satisﬁes (3.2),
w2v(c2, g) = w2v(c1, g)− γy1 + γy2. (A.7)
Thus, by (2.6) and (2.15),
W(a) = λ1w1v(c1, g)− λ1γy1 + λ2w2v(c1, g)− λ2γy1. (A.8)
Using the normalization in (2.16), (A.8) can be rewritten as
W(a) = λ1w1v(c1, g) + (1− λ1)w2v(c1, g) + w2v(c1, g)− 2γy1. (A.9)
Note that
β1 = λ1w1 + (1− λ1)w2. (A.10)
Hence, (A.9) implies that
W(a) = β1v(c1, g) + w2v(c1, g)− 2γy1. (A.11)
Using (A.7) in (A.11), it follows that
W(a) = β1v(c1, g) + w2v(c2, g)− γy1 − γy2. (A.12)
Because a satisﬁes (3.1), (A.12) implies that
W(a) = β1v(c1, g) + β2v(c2, g)− γp(c1 + c2)− γqg, (A.13)
where use has been made of the fact that β2 = w2. Thus, W(a) = W (c1, c2, g), as
required.
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Proof of Proposition 1. First note that (3.2) can be rewritten as
y˜2 = y˜1 +
1
γ
w2[v(c˜2, g˜)− v(c˜1, g˜)]. (A.14)
By adding the expressions in (3.8) and (3.9), it is then clear that these equalities are
equivalent to (3.1) and (3.2).
Suppose that a˜ = (y˜1, y˜2, c˜1, c˜2, g˜) is the allocation identiﬁed in part (ii) of Proposition
1. The preceding discussion shows that the production-feasibility constraint and person
two’s incentive-compatibility constraint both bind. From Lemma 2, we know that c˜2 > c˜1
at a solution to the reduced-form problem. Because v is increasing in its ﬁrst argument,
the income in (3.9) is larger than the income in (3.8). Single-crossing then implies
that a˜ satisﬁes person one’s incentive-compatibility constraint with a strict inequality.
Thus, a˜ satisﬁes all of the constraints of the optimal nonlinear income tax problem. The
equivalence of the allocations in parts (i) and (ii) of Proposition 1 now follows from
Lemma 3 and the two equalities in Lemma 1.
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) It follows from (3.10) that
γp
βivci(c˜i, g˜)
= 1, i = 1, 2. (A.15)
Because β1 < w1, (3.12) and (A.15) imply that
MTR1(y˜1, c˜1, g˜) = 1− γp/w1vc1(c˜1, g˜) > 1− γp/β1vc1(c˜1, g˜) = 0. (A.16)
Because all the quantities in the second term on the right-hand side of (3.12) are positive,
(A.16) establishes (3.13).
(ii) By deﬁnition, β2 = w2. Hence, (3.14) follows directly from (3.12) and (A.15).
(iii) It follows from (3.10) that
βivci(c˜i, g˜) = γp, i = 1, 2. (A.17)
Dividing each term in (3.11) by γp and using (A.17) implies that
β1vg(c˜1, g˜)
β1vc1(c˜1, g˜)
+
β2vg(c˜2, g˜)
β2vc2(c˜2, g˜)
− γq
γp
= 0. (A.18)
Using (2.8) in (A.18) and simplifying, we obtain (3.15).
Proof of Proposition 3. Implicit diﬀerentiation of (3.10) and (3.11) yields
A[dc1, dc2, dg]
 = B[dq, dp, dγ, dβ1, dβ2]. (A.19)
Because v is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, the middle expressions of (3.10) and (3.11)
are continuously diﬀerentiable functions of the eight variables c1, c2, g, q, p, γ, β1, and
β2.
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Consider any (q¯, p¯, γ¯, β¯1, β¯2) ∈ R5++. Provided that A is invertible at (q¯, p¯, γ¯, β¯1, β¯2),
it follows from the Implicit Function Theorem that there exists a neighbourhood N con-
tained in R5++ of (q¯, p¯, γ¯, β¯1, β¯2) and a unique continuously diﬀerentiable function F¯ : N →
R
3
++ mapping (q, p, γ, β1, β2) to (c1, c2, g) for which (F¯ (q, p, γ, β1, β2), q, p, γ, β1, β2) solves
(3.10) and (3.11) for all (q, p, γ, β1, β2) ∈ N .20 Because the function F¯ is unique, it must
therefore coincide with F on N . Thus, to show that F is continuously diﬀerentiable, it
only remains to show that A is invertible at any (q, p, γ, β1, β2) ∈ R5++.
In order to establish that A is invertible, it suﬃces to show that A has a non-zero
determinant. Performing the Laplace expansion along the ﬁrst row of A yields
|A| = β1vc1c1 [β2vc2c2(β1vg1g1 + β2vg2g2)− (β2vc2g)2] + β1vc1g[−β1β2vc1gvc2c2 ]
= β1β
2
2vc1c1 [vc2c2vg2g2 − (vc2g)2] + β21β2vc2c2 [vc1c1vg1g1 − (vc1g)2].
(A.20)
Strict concavity of v implies that each term in square brackets in the second line of (A.20)
is positive and that vcici < 0 for i = 1, 2. Thus, |A| < 0.
Multiplying both sides of (A.19) by A−1 yields (4.2).
Proof of Proposition 4. By the ﬁnal row of (4.9),
∂g∗
∂q
=
γβ1β2vc1c1vc2c2
|A| . (A.21)
Strict concavity of v ensures that the numerator on the right-hand side of (A.21) is
positive. In the proof of Proposition 3, we have shown that |A| is negative. Thus,
∂g∗/∂q < 0, which establishes part (i) of the Proposition.
The ﬁrst and second rows of (4.9) show that
∂c∗i
∂q
= −γβ1β2vcjcj|A| vcig, i, j = 1, 2, i = j. (A.22)
By the strict concavity of v, vcici < 0 for i = 1, 2. Because |A| < 0, the fraction that
multiplies vcig on the right-hand side of (A.22) is positive. Hence, ∂c
∗
i /∂q has the opposite
sign as vcig, which establishes part (ii) of the Proposition.
The chain rule and (4.9) imply that at (c∗1(q, p, γ, β1, β2), g
∗(q, p, γ, β1, β2)),
∂vc1
∂q
= vc1c1
∂c∗1
∂q
+ vc1g
∂g∗
∂q
=
1
|A|(−vc1c1γβ1β2vc2c2vc1g + vc1gγβ1β2vc1c1vc2c2) = 0.
(A.23)
It then follows from (A.23) and (3.12) that the marginal tax rate faced by person one is
invariant to the increase in q, which establishes part (iii) of the Proposition.
20See Spivak (1965, Theorem 2-12) for a statement of the Implicit Function Theorem that is general
enough for our purposes.
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Proof of Proposition 5. By (4.10) and the deﬁnition of µ, we have
∂c∗1
∂p
=
γ{β22 [vc2c2vg2g2 − (vc2g)2] + β1β2vc2c2vg1g1 + β1β2vc1gvc2g}
|A| , (A.24)
∂c∗2
∂p
=
γ{β21 [vc1c1vg1g1 − (vc1g)2] + β1β2vc1c1vg2g2 + β1β2vc1gvc2g}
|A| , (A.25)
and
∂g∗
∂p
= −γ{β1β2vc1c1vc2g + β1β2vc2c2vc1g}|A| . (A.26)
By the strict concavity of v, each of the ﬁrst two terms in braces on the right-hand
sides of (A.24) and (A.25) are positive. In each of the three cases considered in the
Proposition, the last terms in these braces are nonnegative. Thus, because |A| < 0,
(A.24) and (A.25) imply that the optimal private consumption of each individual falls
when p increases in all three parts of the Proposition.
In part (i) of the Proposition, both vc1g and vc2g are nonnegative and at least one of
these partial derivatives is positive. Thus, both terms in braces in (A.26) are nonpositive
and at least one of these terms is negative. Because |A| < 0, it then follows from (A.26)
that the optimal provision of the public good decreases when p increases.
Simply replacing “nonpositive” with “nonnegative” and “positive” with “negative”
in the preceding argument shows that the optimal provision of the public good increases
when p increases in part (ii) of the Proposition.
In part (iii) of the Proposition, both vc1g = 0 and vc2g = 0. Thus, the numerator on
the right-hand side of (A.26) vanishes and the optimal provision of the public good does
not change when p increases.
Proof of Proposition 6. By (4.11) and the deﬁnition of µ, we have
∂c∗1
∂γ
=
p{[β22 [vc2c2vg2g2 − (vc2g)2] + β1β2(vc2c2vg1g1 + vc1gvc2g)} − qβ1β2vc2c2vc1g
|A| , (A.27)
∂c∗2
∂γ
=
p{[β21 [vc1c1vg1g1 − (vc1g)2] + β1β2(vc1c1vg2g2 + vc1gvc2g)} − qβ1β2vc1c1vc2g
|A| , (A.28)
and
∂g∗
∂γ
=
−p{β1β2(vc1c1vc2g + vc2c2vc1g)}+ qβ1β2vc1c1vc2c2
|A| . (A.29)
By the strict concavity of v, the ﬁrst term in braces on the right-hand sides of (A.27)
and (A.28) are positive and all of the own second partial derivatives of v are negative.
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By assumption, vc1g and vc2g are nonnegative. Hence, the numerators on the right-hand
sides of (A.27), (A.28), and (A.29) are all positive. Because |A| < 0, it then follows that
all three of the partial derivatives in these equations are negative.
Because the optimal values of c1, c2, and g all decrease when p is increased, the sum
of the two before-tax incomes must also decrease in order for the production-feasibility
constraint to bind.
Proof of Proposition 7. By the last row of (4.12), we have
∂g∗
∂β1
=
vc1β1β2vc2c2vc1g − vg1β1β2vc1c1vc2c2
|A| . (A.30)
By assumption, vc1g ≥ 0. Thus, the increasingness and strict concavity of v imply that
the ﬁrst term in the numerator of the right-hand side of (A.30) is nonpositive and the
second term is positive. Thus, this numerator is negative. Because |A| < 0, it then follows
from (A.30) that the optimal provision of the public good increases when β1 increases,
which establishes part (i) of the Proposition.
The ﬁrst row of (4.12) and the deﬁnition of µ imply that
∂c∗1
∂β1
=
−vc1{β22 [vc2c2vg2g2 − (vc2g)2] + β1β2vc2c2vg1g1}+ vg1β1β2vc2c2vc1g
|A| . (A.31)
Strict concavity of v implies that the expression enclosed in braces on the right-hand side
of (A.31) is positive. Thus, the ﬁrst term in the numerator in this fraction is negative.
By assumption, vc1g ≥ 0 and, hence, the increasingness and strict concavity of v imply
that the second term in the numerator is nonpositive. Therefore, the entire numerator
is negative. Because |A| < 0, it then follows from (A.31) that person one’s optimal
consumption of the private good increases when β1 increases, which establishes part (ii)
of the Proposition.
The second row of (4.12) implies that
∂c∗2
∂β1
=
(−vc1β1β2vc1g + vg1β1β2vc1c1
|A|
)
vc2g. (A.32)
Because, by assumption, vc1g ≥ 0, the increasingness and strict concavity of v imply that
the numerator in the fraction that appears on the right-hand side of (A.32) is negative.
Thus, this fraction is positive because |A| < 0. Hence, the sign of ∂c∗2/∂β1 is the same
as the sign of vc2g, which establishes part (iii) of the Proposition.
When both vc1g and vc2g are nonnegative, the ﬁrst three parts of the Proposition imply
that the optimal values of c1 and g decrease and the optimal value of c2 does not increase
when β1 is increased. Because the technology parameters p and q are being held ﬁxed, the
sum of the two before-tax incomes must decrease in order for the production-feasibility
constraint to bind, which establishes part (iv) of the Proposition.
29
Proof of Proposition 9. By the chain rule and the deﬁnitions (3.5) and (3.6) of β1 and
β2,
∂x∗
∂w2
=
∂x∗
∂β1
∂β1
∂w2
+
∂x∗
∂β2
∂β2
∂w2
= (1− λ1)∂x
∗
∂β1
+
∂x∗
∂β2
, x = c1, c2, g. (A.33)
By assumption, vc1g = 0 and vc2g = 0 for all values of their arguments. Hence, the last
rows of (4.12) and (4.13) simplify to
∂g∗
∂β1
=
−vg1β1β2vc1c1vc2c2
|A| (A.34)
and
∂g∗
∂β2
=
−vg2β1β2vc1c1vc2c2
|A| . (A.35)
Because v is assumed to be additively separable and each individual enjoys the same
amount of the public good, vg1 = vg2 . Hence, by (A.33), (A.34), and (A.35),
∂g∗
∂w2
=
−vg1β1β2vc1c1vc2c2(1− λ1)
|A| +
−vg1β1β2vc1c1vc2c2
|A|
=
−vg1β1β2vc1c1vc2c2(2− λ1)
|A| .
(A.36)
Because λ1 < 2 and |A| < 0, it follows from the increasingness and strict concavity of v
that both the numerator and denominator on the right-hand side of the last line in (A.36)
are negative. Thus, this fraction is positive, which establishes part (i) of the Proposition.
Because vc1g = 0 and vc2g = 0, the second row of (4.13) vanishes. Hence, from (A.33),
∂c∗1
∂w2
= (1− λ1) ∂c
∗
1
∂β1
+ 0. (A.37)
Proposition 7 applies because vc1g is nonnegative. Hence, ∂c
∗
1/∂β1 > 0. But λ1 > 1, so
the expression in (A.37) is negative, which establishes part (ii) of the Proposition.
An analogous argument using the ﬁrst row of (4.12) shows that
∂c∗2
∂w2
= (1− λ1)0 + ∂c
∗
2
∂β2
=
∂c∗2
∂β2
. (A.38)
The adjusted welfare weights enter symmetrically in the reduced-form optimization prob-
lem. Consequently, the comparative statics of β1 and β2 are identical once the roles of
the two individuals are permuted. Thus, it follows from Proposition 7 that ∂c∗2/∂β2 > 0,
which establishes part (iii) of the Proposition.
Finally, because increasing w2 decreases β1, vc1 must increase in order to satisfy the
ﬁrst-order condition (3.10). Thus, from (3.12), person one’s marginal tax rate must
increase, which establishes part (iv) of the Proposition.
30
References
Boadway, R., Cuﬀ, K., Marchand, M., 2000. Optimal income taxation with quasi-linear
preferences revisited. Journal of Public Economic Theory 2, 435–460.
Boadway, R., Keen, M., 1993. Public goods, self-selection and optimal income taxation.
International Economic Review 34, 463–477.
Boadway, R., Pestieau, P., 2004. Tagging and redistributive taxation, unpublished
manuscript, Department of Economics, Queens University and Centre de Recherche
en Economie Publique et de la Population, Universite´ de Lie`ge.
Cebreiro-Go´mez, A., 2002. Optimal income taxation, production eﬃciency and mobility
of labour, unpublished manuscript, Department of Economics, University of Essex.
Christiansen, V., 1981. Evaluation of public projects under optimum taxation. Review
of Economic Studies 48, 447–457.
Diamond, P. A., 1998. Optimal income taxation: An example with a U-shaped pattern
of optimal marginal tax rates. American Economic Review 88, 83–95.
Edwards, J., Keen, M., Tuomala, M., 1994. Income tax, commodity taxes and public
good provision: A brief guide. FinanzArchiv 51, 472–487.
Guesnerie, R., 1995. A Contribution to the Pure Theory of Taxation. Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, Cambridge.
Guesnerie, R., Seade, J., 1983. Nonlinear pricing in a ﬁnite economy. Journal of Public
Economics 17, 157–179.
Hamilton, J., Pestieau, P., 2002. Optimal income taxation and the ability distribution:
Implications for migration equilibria. International Tax and Public Finance, forthcom-
ing.
Lollivier, S., Rochet, J.-C., 1983. Bunching and second-order conditions: A note on
optimal tax theory. Journal of Economic Theory 31, 392–400.
Mirrlees, J. A., 1971. An exploration in the theory of optimum income taxation. Review
of Economic Studies 38, 175–208.
Mirrlees, J. A., 1976. Optimal tax theory: A synthesis. Journal of Public Economics 6,
327–358.
Myles, G. D., 1995. Public Economics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Nava, M., Schroyen, F., Marchand, M., 1996. Optimal ﬁscal and public expenditure
policy in a two-class economy. Journal of Public Economics 61, 119–137.
Pigou, A. C., 1947. A Study in Public Finance, 3rd Edition. Macmillan, London.
Rochet, J.-C., 1987. A necessary and suﬃcient condition for rationalizability in a quasi-
linear context. Journal of Mathematical Economics 16, 191–200.
Ro¨ell, A. A., 1985. A note on the marginal tax rate in a ﬁnite economy. Journal of Public
Economics 28, 267–272.
Samuelson, P. A., 1954. The pure theory of public expenditure. Review of Economics
and Statistics 36, 387–389.
Spence, A. M., 1974. Market Signaling: Information Transfer in Hiring and Related
Screening Processes. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
31
Spivak, M., 1965. Calculus on Manifolds. W. A. Benjamin, Menlo Park, CA.
Statistics Canada, 1998. National Economic and Financial Accounts, Quarterly Estimates
1961–1992. Statistics Canada, Ottawa, Catalogue No. 13-001-SPB.
Stiglitz, J. E., 1983. Self-selection and Pareto eﬃcient taxation. Journal of Public Eco-
nomics 17, 213–240.
Tuomala, M., 1990. Optimal Income Tax and Redistribution. Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Weymark, J. A., 1986. A reduced-form optimal nonlinear income tax problem. Journal
of Public Economics 30, 199–217.
Weymark, J. A., 1987. Comparative static properties of optimal nonlinear income taxes.
Econometrica 55, 1165–1185.
32
